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THE USE OF SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS TO COMBAT
DRUNK DRIVERS: KNOWING WHEN
TO SAY WHEN
State v. Welch'
To combat the tragedy drunk drivers cause on this country's roadways,
governmental bodies and groups at the grassroots level have established a
wide range of measures. 2 These efforts are obviously directed at a worthwhile
cause.' However, the use of sobriety checkpoints to promote this cause is
the subject of a great deal of controversy. 4 A sobriety checkpoint is a
roadblock law enforcement officials set up to detect and deter drunk drivers.
After a car is stopped at the roadblock, an officer generally will ask the
driver to produce a valid driver's license and vehicle registration form.
During this brief encounter, the officer will check for outward signs of
intoxication, such as slurred speech by the driver or an odor of alcohol.
If the officer has reason to believe the driver is intoxicated, she directs
the driver to a secondary location where the driver takes a field sobriety
test.5 Of course, this could eventually result in the driver's arrest. Since
the initial stop of the vehicle is not based on probable cause, or even
reasonable suspicion, a sobriety checkpoint raises serious fourth amendment
questions. 6 With the decision in State v. Welch,7 Missouri joined twenty-
1. 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
2. Ifft, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457, 1457-58 (1983).
3. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in
Light of Delaware v. Prouse?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813 (1984).
5. Jones, The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints, 43 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1469, 1469 (1986); Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Consti-
tutional in Light of Delaware v. Prouse?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813, 813 (1984);
Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless Seizures: The Use of
Roadblocks to Apprehend Drunk Drivers, 71 IowA L. REv. 577, 600 (1986) [here-
inafter Constitutional Limits].
6. 4 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND Smzur: A TREATSE ON TrH FouarH AM Dr-
MENT § 10.8(d) (1987 & Supp. 1988); Ifft, supra note 2, at 1458. The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
1
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eight states that have addressed these difficult constitutional considerations.'
This Note will discuss the court's rationale in Welch. It will show
which questions the decision answered about the use of sobriety checkpoints
in Missouri and which questions remain for future consideration. In ad-
dition, the Note will examine the various constitutional issues surrounding
a state's use of a sobriety checkpoint.
TBE WELCH CASE
On July 5, 1986, the Missouri Highway Patrol conducted a sobriety
checkpoint9 and detained Gary Dean Welch.' 0 After checking Welch's driv-
er's license, a state trooper noticed a strong odor of beer and observed
signs of intoxication." During field sobriety tests, Welch had difficulty
walking and reciting the alphabet.'2 He also displayed poor responsive eye
movement.'3 The patrolmen arrested Welch and took him to the county
jail24 A breathalyzer test showed his blood alcohol content (BAC) level
to be 0.17%15 and he was charged with driving while intoxicated. At trial,
Welch moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the sobriety
checkpoint, 6 claiming the checkpoint violated his fourth amendment rights.' 7
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
7. 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
8. Courts in twenty-one states, including Missouri, have upheld the con-
stitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. Seven of these twenty-one states have also
found that certain checkpoints were not conducted in a constitutionally permissible
manner. Eight other states have ruled that sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional,
but only three have found them to be unconstitutional per se. For additional
information, see infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
9. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 626.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Legal intoxication in Missouri can be predicated upon a BAC level
in excess of 0.10%. Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 577.012 (1986).
16. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 626.
17. Welch also claimed similar rights under the Missouri Constitution were
violated as well as four state statutes. Id. This Note does not address the statutory
arguments. Concerning Welch's claim relating to the Missouri Constitution, it is
clear that both state and federal constitutional considerations apply, at least to the
extent of the fourth amendment, to protect an individual during a sobriety check-
point. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967). While a state has the power to grant more protection under
its own constitution than what is provided under the fourth amendment, it may
[Vol. 54
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The Court overruled his motion and used the evidence to convict him. 18
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, 19 noting that this was the
first case in Missouri to address the constitutionality of sobriety check-
points. 20 It held that sobriety checkpoints are not unconstitutional per se,21
and that the conduct of this particular checkpoint was constitutionally
permissible.22 The Court emphasized that this checkpoint proceeded pursuant
to a predesigned plan which supervisory personnel established to govern
the procedure of the checkpoint, that motorists were warned in advance
of the checkpoint, and that the detention of the drivers was minimal.2 3
The manner in which police conduct a particular checkpoint is certainly
relevant to its constitutionality. This is evident from an analysis of decisions
from states that have ruled on the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints.
Courts in twenty-one states have upheld sobriety checkpoints, 24 while fifteen
not provide less protection. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). However, since the Missouri
Constitution grants the same protection as that afforded by the fourth amendment,
Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632, it was not necessary to consider differences that might
exist between state and federal constitutions in deciding Welch.
The states of Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington have determined that sobriety
checkpoints are unconstitutional per se. State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293,
756 P.2d 1057, 1063 (1988). It is interesting to note that the constitutions of Oregon
and Washington both provide greater protection to individuals than the fourth
amendment. State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1303 (La. 1988); City of Seattle v.
Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, -, 755 P.2d 775, 776-77 (1988) (en banc). By
contrast, New Jersey has upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints despite
a state constitution that grants greater protection than the fourth amendment. State
v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, -, 493 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1985).
18. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 626.
19. Id. at 633.
20. Id. at 626.
21. Id. at 633.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984); State v. Superior
Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321,
743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987); State v. Abelson, 485 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984);
People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1068 (1986); State v. Garcia, 489 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 500
N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1986); State v. Riley, 377
N.W.2d 242 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174
(1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 521 N.E.2d 987 (1988); State v. Welch,
755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 509
A.2d 744 (1986); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980);
City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1987);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984); State v.
Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 34 (1985); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277,
1989]
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states have found certain checkpoints unconstitutional.7 However, only
three of these fifteen states have found sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional
per se,2 and seven have found checkpoints operated under different cir-
cumstances to be valid. 27
A review of United States Supreme Court opinions also provides guid-
ance in this area. Delaware v. Prouse28 outlines the analysis to use in
determining the constitutionality of a roadblock. It requires balancing the
individual's fourth amendment concerns against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests which the roadblock serves. 29 The factors involved
in this balancing are the gravity of the public concern that is the purpose
of the roadblock, the degree to which the roadblock advances that concern,
and the severity of the intrusion upon motorists stopped at the roadblock.30
To minimize the intrusion on motorists, the court in Prouse required law
enforcement personnel to establish "neutral criteria" to limit the discretion
of officers who perform the stops. 31 Therefore, the Welch court correctly
pointed out the important role of supervisory personnel in selecting the
site of a sobriety checkpoint, establishing guidelines for its operation, 32 and
535 A.2d 1035 (1987); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442 (1985); Lowe
v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1084 (1986).
In Welch, it is noted that Pennsylvania found sobriety checkpoints unconsti-
tutional in deciding Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa. Super. 306, 502 A2d 221
(1985). Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 629. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reviewed this decision two years later and concluded that sobriety checkpoints could
be conducted in compliance with the Pennsylvania state constitution. Commonwealth
v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, __ , 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (1987).
25. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983)
(en banc); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v.
Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273,
383 N.W.2d 461 (1986); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985);
State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d
562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711
(1987); Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. 49, 519 A.2d 984 (1986); State
v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775
(1988).
26. Henderson, 114 Idaho at - , 756 P.2d at 1063.
27. States which have found sobriety checkpoints constitutional under one
set of facts and unconstitutional under another include Arizona, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
28. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
29. Id. at 654.
30. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
31. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662. See also Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (neutral
limitations control conduct of officers performing roadblock).
32. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632. The roadblock is to be established at a site
[Vol. 54
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not permitting officers in the field to randomly select which vehicles to
stop.33
The United States Supreme Court also stressed the importance of
reducing the fear and annoyance to motorists detained at a roadblock.
The considerations taken into account are illustrated by comparing cases
which involve roving patrols to detect illegal aliens with a case that involves
a checkpoint set up for the same purpose. Roving border patrol stops in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce4 and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States35
were held to be unconstitutional. However, in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,3 the Court upheld a checkpoint used to detect illegal aliens. The
Court distinguished Martinez-Fuerte from Brignoni-Ponce and Almeida-
Sanchez by pointing out that the fear and concern caused to individuals
as a result of being detained is appreciably diminished at a checkpoint
stop.37 In Welch, the manner in which the roadblock was operated clearly
diminished the fear that may accompany a roadside stop. In addition to
stopping other vehicles, police placed a sign on the roadway to tell drivers
the purpose of the stop before they were detained.3 8 Further, patrol vehicles
had flashing lights and officers wore reflective vests to indicate the official
nature of the operation. 39
A third criteria which the Welch court considered important is the
length of time each driver is detained at the roadblock. This is a relevant
factor in determining the degree of intrusiveness on motorists who are
stopped at the checkpoint.40 Officers are to detain drivers only to briefly
where a large number of alcohol-related arrests or accidents have occurred. Ingersoll
v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1343, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 58
(1987); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, -, 493 A.2d 1271, 1288 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, -535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (1987). But
see State v. Webb, 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (checkpoint established
near drinking establishment held invalid); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.
2d 454, -, 755 P.2d 775, 776-78 (1988) (checkpoint designed to stop maximum
number of drunk drivers held invalid). It is to be conducted at a time when a
significant number of drunk drivers are expected to occupy the roads. Palmer, 43
Cal. 3d at 1345, 743 P.2d at 1315, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59; State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105
N.M. 655, 659, 735 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Ct. App. 1987); Tarbert, 517 Pa. at -,
535 A.2d at 1043.
33. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 633.
34. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
35. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
36. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
37. Id. at 558. This results from the fact that motorists at a checkpoint can
see other vehicles being stopped as well as visible signs of the officer's authority.
Id.
38. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632.
39. Id.
40. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1346, 743 P.2d 1299, 1316, 241
Cal. Rptr. 42, 59 (1987); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986); State
19891
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explain the purpose of the stop and to check for signs of intoxication .4
To justify a more extensive intrusion, such as conducting a field sobriety
test, an officer must have articulable suspicion that the motorist is drunk.
42
The officer may request that an individual submit to a chemical analysis
test only when there is probable cause to believe that the person is drunk.
43
The roadblock in Welch complied with these standards. 44
BEYOND THE WELCH CASE
While the criteria considered by the court in Welch are relevant issues
in a constitutional analysis of a sobriety checkpoint, several issues that
pertain to the conduct of a checkpoint were not decided. These include
whether law enforcement officers may use a systematic formula that does
not stop all traffic, whether advance publicity is necessary prior to con-
ducting the checkpoint, and whether law enforcement officers need a search
warrant to operate a checkpoint. Additional issues include the non-per-
manent nature of a checkpoint, and safety aspects of a sobriety checkpoint.
The Welch court pointed out that a roadblock which is designed to
stop all vehicles may be permissible. 45 However, it is not clear from the
v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); City of Las Cruces
v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 659, 735 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Ct. App. 1987); Com-
monwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, -, 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (1987); State v.
Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 571, 496 A.2d 442, 448 (1985). Courts generally do not
establish a specific length of time in helping to determine the severity of the
intrusion. The standard is one of "reasonableness." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
50 (1979). Roadblocks have been upheld where drivers were detained for only 30
seconds. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 506, 479 A.2d 903, 914 (1984); Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, -, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1084 (1986). The United States Supreme Court upheld a border patrol check-
point in which the defendant was subjected to a three to five minute detention.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 (1976). By comparison, in
Welch, a majority of drivers were detained less than a minute. Welch, 755 S.W.2d
at 632.
41. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59;
Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 659, 735 P.2d at 1165.
42. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59;
4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 69; Ifft, supra note 2, at 1486.
43. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59;
Ifft, supra note 2, at 1486.
44. A majority of vehicles were detained less than a minute. Welch, 755
S.W.2d at 632. A field sobriety test was not given unless an officer suspected that
a driver was intoxicated. Id. at 633. A breathalyzer t~st was only conducted if the
driver showed signs of intoxication during the field sobriety test. Id. at 626.
45. Id. at 627, 633.
[Vol. 54490
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opinion whether this is required.46 The majority opinion in Prouse indicated
that a roadblock which stops all traffic may be constitutional since this
type of stop prevents the unconstrained discretion of officers in the field
to randomly stop whichever vehicles they choose.47 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun suggested that a predetermined system, such as stopping
every tenth car, might be used. 48 If supervisory personnel establish such a
system before conducting the checkpoint, it also prevents officers who
perform the roadblock from using their discretion to single out which
vehicles to stop. Therefore, a plan that does not provide for directing all
traffic into the checkpoint seems to be in compliance with Prouse, so long
as officers use some formula which prevents them from deciding which
cars to stop.
49
When a plan for conducting a roadblock does provide that officers
must stop all traffic, officers in the field can not be expected to comply
with this rule in all situations. If traffic flow becomes heavy and all vehicles
are stopped, a longer detention for each driver and safety hazards from
cars lined up along the road could result. To avoid this problem, officers
need limited discretion to allow them to pull over all vehicles when traffic
is light, and to use regular intervals at other times.5 0 It is also appropriate
for officers to wave traffic through the checkpoint when a predetermined
number of cars are lined up.5 ' The officers conducting the Welch roadblock
used this procedure. 2
Advance publicity of a sobriety checkpoint is frequently considered in
determining its constitutionality.5 3 This serves two purposes. First, drivers
46. One factor that the court stressed is that supervisory personnel in this
case had put together a plan prior to conducting the checkpoint. Id. at 632. As
part of this plan, there could be no random selection by officers in the field
regarding which vehicles to stop. Id. at 633. Since the plan in Welch provided for
stopping all vehicles, id., it is not clear whether the court would give approval to
a plan that provided for stopping, e.g., every third car or every blue car.
47. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
48. Id. at 664.
49. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1342, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241
Cal. Rptr. 42, 57 (1987); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433, 438 (Fla. 1986); People
v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 526, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1984).
50. See 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 79.
51. Id. at 79. LaFave recommends that officers keep a log of what measures
are taken at the roadblock in order to defend their activities in a judicial setting.
Id. at 80.
52. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 633.
53. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60;
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); Commonwealth
v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); State v. Kirk,
202 N.J. Super. 28, -, 493 A.2d 1271, 1288 (1985); City of Las Cruces v.
Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 659, 735 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Ct. App. 1987); Common-
wealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. 49, -, 519 A.2d 984, 992-93 (1986) (footnote
omitted). But see Jones v. State, 483 So. 2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (public dissemination
of roadblock information not required).
7
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are less likely to be afraid or surprised if they have been made aware
before they stop that a roadblock will be conducted in the community.14
The second purpose advance publicity serves concerns the distinction between
the uses of sobriety checkpoints as a means of deterring drunk drivers as
opposed to detecting drunk drivers. This is important in that it is easier
to justify the use of a checkpoint as a deterrent to would-be drunk drivers
than as a means of detecting drunk drivers.55
Where advance publicity is lacking, it is only logical to conclude that
the sole purpose of the checkpoint is to detect drunk drivers.56 A checkpoint
can only be effective in deterring a drunk person from driving if he or
she is made aware that the checkpoint is in operation prior to getting
behind the wheel.57 Informing the public that a checkpoint will be conducted,
but not disclosing where, creates the greatest deterrent effect. 8 If they
know the location, drunk drivers are encouraged to take a different route
to their destination so as to avoid the checkpoint.5 9
States may require law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant
before conducting a sobriety checkpoint. 60 This idea is based on the "area
54. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. at -, 519 A.2d at 993 n.16; see 4 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 81-82.
55. State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 nn. 2 & 4 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). This conclusion is reached by considering the second element of the con-
stitutional analysis for roadblocks (i.e., the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest). Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). Sobriety checkpoints
may not be as effective as other means of detecting drunk drivers and therefore
they may be an inefficient use of police manpower if detection is their only purpose.
See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. However, sobriety checkpoints pri-
marily promote the public interest through their use as a deterrent to prevent those
who are drunk from driving. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
56. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d at 603 n.2.
57. Cf. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 293, 499 A.2d 977, 982 (1985)
(publicity of sobriety checkpoint is chief means of deterring drunk drivers); Kirk,
202 N.J. Super. at -, 493 A.2d at 1288 (advance publicity acts as substantial
deterrent to would-be drunk drivers); Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 659, 735 P.2d at
1165 (deterrent value of roadblock enhanced by widespread publicity); see 4 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 81-82 (deterrent value of roadblock heightened
by publicity).
58. Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143, 449 N.E.2d 349,
353 (1983); Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. at -, 519 A.2d at 993 n.16. It may be
effective, however, if the public is simply made aware that the police conduct
checkpoints without giving out the date or time they are to be performed. If the
public is aware that checkpoints might be conducted on any given night, the
publicity could create a deterrent effect even on nights when checkpoints are not
being operated.
59. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, -, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984).
60. Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986); State v.
Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D. 1976). One year before Opinion of the Justices,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated a checkpoint operated without a
warrant. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985).
[Vol. 54
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warrant" which the United States Supreme Court approved in Camara v.
Municipal Court.61 In Camara, the Court held that probable cause was a
prerequisite to justify housing inspections for compliance with municipal
codes. 62 It stated, however, that a warrant could be issued based on the
condition of the area to be inspected and that probable cause did not need
to be directed at an individual structure. 63
In applying this logic to a sobriety checkpoint, a neutral magistrate
would review a plan established by law enforcement personnel to ensure
that the location of the roadblock would promote the public interest without
being discriminatory and that the procedure to be followed would not
constitute a serious intrusion to individual travelers." Justice Powell sug-
gested this procedure, albeit in the context of a concurring opinion involving
an unconstitutional border patrol stop. 65
There are several advantages to this approach. First, a neutral magistrate
and law enforcement officials could review decisions concerning the location
and procedures of a checkpoint." While police officers could still conduct
efficient roadblocks, the chance for abuse would be minimized. 67 The second
advantage to this approach is that it furthers the goals of the fourth
amendment without seriously impeding the legitimate goals of law enforce-
ment. 6 A third advantage to a warrant requirement is that it strengthens
the state's chance of winning in a suit to determine the constitutionality
of a particular checkpoint. In a suppression hearing for evidence obtained
without a warrant, the burden of proof is on the state; 69 while the burden
rests with the defendant when a warrant is obtained.70 Thus, when police
61. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
62. Id. at 538.
63. Id.
64. Ifft, supra note 2, at 1484-85; Jones, supra note 5, at 1491-92.
65. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
66. Ifft, supra note 2, at 1484-85; Jones, supra note 5, at 1491-92.
67. See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 78.
68. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (footnote omitted). While the process of
obtaining a warrant may produce some inconvenience to law enforcement officers,
this is not enough, by itself, to dispose of the warrant requirement. Almeida-
Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57, 315 N.E.2d 530,
534-35 (1974); Jones, supra note 5, at 1470.
70. United States v. Henry, 763 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1985); People v.
Wilson, 256 Cal. App. 2d 411, 417, 64 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 903 (1968); Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. at 56, 315 N.E.2d at 534.
1989]
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conduct a checkpoint pursuant to an "area warrant," the burden of proof
shifts from the state to the defendant in a suppression hearing.
Despite this rationale, courts generally have upheld sobriety checkpoints
operated without a warrant." The defendant in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,72 raised the issue in the context of border patrol checks. The United
States Supreme Court held that the requirement of a warrant to conduct
the checkpoint would serve no legitimate purpose.73 The Martinez-Fuerte
Court distinguished Camara by pointing out that the search in Camara
was of a residence, where a warrant is traditionally required.74 The Martinez-
Fuerte Court also suggested that an officer's authority to conduct a roadside
checkpoint is clearly visible to motorists, where such authority is not evident
in the case of a housing inspector.75 Furthermore, the Court added that
the decision to stop a car (i.e., seize) at a checkpoint is made by supervisory
personnel, not the officer in the field. 76
While the Martinez-Fuerte decision focused upon the distinction between
an immobile house and a mobile vehicle, other courts have considered the
mobility of the checkpoint. The rationale for performing a roadblock at
a permanent location is that its function is more likely to become common
knowledge to motorists and therefore they will not be as frightened or
surprised by the detention.7 7 At least one court has found a sobriety
checkpoint to be unconstitutional, due in part to the fact that it was not
conducted at a permanent location.7 However, other courts have been
unpersuaded by this argument. 79 If a checkpoint is to be held at a permanent
location, drivers will avoid that particular road, and thus the roadblock
will lose its deterrent effect and ability to detect drunk drivers. s0 Therefore,
a permanent checkpoint established to combat drunk driving does not
71. 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 77; Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 509, 479 A.2d 903, 912 (1984); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, -, 493
A.2d 1271, 1280 (1985).
72. 428 U.S. 543, 564-66 (1976).
73. Id. It is interesting that the Court's opinion was written by Justice
Powell, who originally proposed the idea of obtaining an "area warrant" for roving
patrols in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
74. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 566.
77. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 293-94, 499 A.2d 977, 983 (1985).
78. State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D. 1976).
79. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1343, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241
Cal. Rptr. 42, 58 (1987); People v. Bartley, 109 1I1. 2d 273, 284, 486 N.E.2d 880,
885 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 507,
479 A.2d 903, 914 (1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 527-28, 473 N.E.2d 1,
5, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1984); 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 76.
80. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 527, 473 N.E.2d at 5, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
[Vol. 54494
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advance the public interest in such a manner as to outweigh the level of
intrusion on individual motorists."
A final factor to consider in analyzing the conduct of a sobriety
checkpoint is motorists' safety while detained at the stop.82 Such consid-
eration includes providing proper lighting as well as protecting motorists
from traffic dangers while they are entering and exiting the roadblock.83
While each of the foregoing criteria are important in analyzing the
constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint, they are considered as elements
in a balancing test. Accordingly, some elements, such as limiting the
discretion of officers in the field, are more important than others.Y Further,
the state is not required to fulfill each element of the test.85
The opinion in Welch focused almost entirely on the way in which a
sobriety checkpoint was conducted. Its analysis did address the degree of
intrusion on individual motorists, one of the elements of the balancing
test.86 Focussing only upon the conduct of the checkpoint, however, fails
to consider other elements of the test, i.e., the gravity of the public concern
and the degree to which the checkpoint advances that concernY
The gravity of the public concern served by sobriety checkpoints is
very high. Drunk drivers cause approximately 25,000 deaths each year in
this country.88 This represents about 55% of all traffic fatalities. 9 Drunk
drivers are expected to cause 708,000 injuries each year, 74,000 of which
81. While a permanent checkpoint such as the one described in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), may promote the public interest in pre-
venting illegal immigrants from crossing the border, it does not necessarily follow
that a permanent checkpoint will likewise promote the interest in combatting drunk
drivers.
82. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 291, 486 N.E.2d at 888; State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); Little, 300 Md. at 506, 479 A.2d at
914; State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, -, 493 A.2d 1271, 1288 (1985); City
of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 659, 735 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Ct. App.
1987).
83. State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986); Betancourt, 105 N.M.
at 659, 735 P.2d at 1165; Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d 802, 810 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
84. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
85. Id. Cf. Bartley, 109 lI. 2d at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 888 (lack of advance
publicity alone did not render checkpoint invalid).
86. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
87. Id.
88. Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. 49, -, 519 A.2d 984,
988 (1986) (citing H.R. RP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982); Federal
Legislation to Combat Drunk Driving, Hearing on S. 671, S. 672, S. 2158 Before
the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
& Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1982); Fell, Alcohol Involvement in
Traffic Accidents (May 1982); NHTSA, Fatal Accident Reporting System: 1980
Report (Oct. 1981)).
89. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d 903, 912 (1984).
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will be serious.9 The economic loss attributable to drunk drivers ranges
from $21-24 billion annually. 9' In addition, it is estimated that 1/10 of all
motor vehicle drivers on a weekend night are drunk. 92 Obviously, the state
has a great interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road.
In discussing the degree to which sobriety checkpoints advance the
public interest, courts most often address two issues. The first is whether
the court should consider that additional means which involve less of an
intrusion on motorists are available to enforce the same interest, i.e., roving
patrols that pull over motorists based on probable cause to believe that
the driver is intoxicated. Some courts have found sobriety checkpoints
unconstitutional based in large part on this argument. 93 Other courts have
either given little weight to this factor or have not considered it at all in
their constitutional analysis.9 4 Proponents of the position that a public
interest can be enforced by roadblocks only when there is no less intrusive
means to do so argue that lack of such an alternative distinguishes the
border patrol checkpoint upheld in Martinez-Fuerte from sobriety check-
points.9 Despite this argument, the fact that the public interest may be
accomplished by a less intrusive means is not enough, by itself, to invalidate
a roadblock.96
The second issue concerning the role of sobriety checkpoints in ad-
vancing the public interest is whether they are an effective means of
90. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. at -, 519 A.2d at 988.
91. Id.
92. Westendorf & Westendorf, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to
Sobriety Checkpoints?, 20 IDAHo L. Ruv. 127, 149 (1984).
93. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 292, 499 A.2d 977, 981 (1985); City of
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, -, 755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (en banc).
See also Comment, The Constitutionality of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 58 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 109, 115 (1986).
94. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 286-87, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); State v. Garcia, 489 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014
(1986); Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, -, 521 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1988).
95. Koppel, 127 N.H. at 293, 499 A.2d at 983 (checkpoint is only effective
means of detecting illegal aliens).
96. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). Authority for this
proposition is also found in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse,
the United States Supreme Court held that states may perform roadblocks to enforce
their interest in seeing that drivers of motor vehicles comply with license and vehicle
registration laws so long as they properly limit both the intrusion on motorists
and the discretion of officers in the field. Id. at 663. It was also the impression
of the Court that less intrusive means existed to enforce the state's interest. As
an example, the Court rationalized that an unlicensed driver is more likely to
commit a traffic violation and therefore will be more apt to come into contact
with law enforcement officials. Id. at 659. The Court also mentioned that police
officers may enforce the public interest by observing license plates to see that they
are updated. Id. at 660.
12
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combatting the damage drunk drivers cause. While the existence of roving
patrols (i.e., a less intrusive means than a roadblock) does not make
sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional by itself," this does not mean the
use of a checkpoint actually promotes the public interest. A good argument
can be made that sobriety checkpoints actually hinder the efforts of law
enforcement to detect drunk drivers since they require an inefficient ex-
penditure of resources and personnel. 9 It is likely that far fewer DWI
arrests will result from a checkpoint than from a roving officer. 99 A typical
checkpoint also produces a low number of arrests in comparison to the
number of vehicles stopped. 100
The low number of arrests likely to result at a sobriety checkpoint in
comparison to those from a roving officer does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that checkpoints are counterproductive. Sobriety checkpoints can
be successful in detecting a certain percentage of drunk drivers whom roving
patrols would not otherwise apprehend. 10 1 This is illustrated by comparing
97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98. State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, -, 756 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (1988)
(same number of officers at roadblock would make more arrests of drunk drivers
if they were on roving patrol).
99. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, -, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984);
Henderson, 114 Idaho at -, 756 P.2d at 1060-61; State v. Koppel, 127 N.H.
286, 288, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (1985).
100. In State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983) (Prager, J.,
dissenting), fifteen DWI arrests resulted from a sobriety checkpoint in which 2,000
- 3,000 cars were stopped. Id. at 545, 673 P.2d at 1187. Statistics from other
jurisdictions show somewhat comparable figures. In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (en banc), a total of fourteen DWI arrests
were made out of 5,763 vehicles that were detained. Id. at -, 663 P.2d at 993.
Sobriety checkpoints in New Hampshire produced eighteen arrests out of 1,680
motorists that were stopped. Koppel, 127 N.H. at 288, 499 A.2d at 979. The
success rate of detecting drunk drivers in these cases ranges from 0.24% to 1.07%,
with an average success rate of about 0.5%. But see State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d
158, 161 (Ind. 1986), cert denied, 107 U.S. 1889 (1986) (seven percent of drivers
stopped at checkpoint were intoxicated).
It seems fair to conclude that a very large number of innocent travelers will
be detained at a sobriety checkpoint for every one that is arrested. The United
States Supreme Court, however, upheld a border patrol checkpoint that resulted
in illegal immigrants being found in 171 vehicles at a checkpoint where 146,000
were stopped, a success rate of only 0.12%. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 554 (1976). See also 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 74.
The court in Welch did not consider it to be relevant that a low number of
arrests take place for the total number of drivers that are detained at the checkpoint.
Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 633. It was correctly pointed out by the court that it only
takes one drunk driver to extinguish lives and destroy property. However, this
point addresses the gravity of the public concern, not the degree that checkpoints
advance that concern.
101. Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. 49, -, 519 A.2d 984,
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the Blood Alcohol Content level of drunk drivers arrested at sobriety
checkpoints in Delaware with the Blood Alcohol Content level of drivers
arrested by roving patrols.' °2 Those arrested at checkpoints had an average
BAC level of 0.14%, while drunk drivers apprehended by roving patrols
have an average BAC of 0.169% - 0.20%. 101 The strong inference these
findings suggest is that some intoxicated drivers who escape detection by
roving patrols can be discovered at checkpoints. This is important since
a driver with a Blood Alcohol Content level in excess of 0.10% is six
times more likely to cause a traffic accident than a sober driver.1°4 A drunk
driver may elude roving patrols since the driver does not necessarily show
signs of intoxication at all times he is on the road.10 5 Furthermore, a drunk
driver may be involved in an accident before a roving officer can stop
her. °6
Sobriety checkpoints also promote the public interest by deterring drunk
persons from driving' 7 or encouraging one who will be driving from having
"one more for the road." 108 The deterrent effect is enhanced by promoting
the checkpoint to the community prior to its operation so that potential
drunk drivers are aware of its existence before they enter their vehicles.1' 9
Intoxicated persons who feel they can drive in a manner that will not
arouse suspicion from a roving patrol officer are more likely to change
their attitude about getting behind the wheel if they are aware that a
sobriety checkpoint is being conducted." 0 They may ask a spouse or com-
102. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. at -, 519 A.2d at 990.
103. Id. at -, 519 A.2d at 990.
104. Id. at -, 519 A.2d at 990-91; see also W. BoRUsTEiN, PROBLEMS IN
ENFORCEMENT, ADJUDICATION, AND SANCTIONING 655-62 (1983)).
105. Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, -, 535 A.2d 1035, 1044
(1987); 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 72-73; Ifft, supra note 2, at
1471.
106. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, - , 691 P.2d 992,
999 (1983) (en banc) (Feldman, J., specially concurring); People v. Bartley, 109
Ill. 2d 273, 286, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986);
4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 73.
107. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, -, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984);
Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1339-40, 743 P.2d 1299, 1309-10, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 53 (1987); Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886; State v. Garcia,
489 N.E.2d 168, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1986); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 526-27, 473
N.E.2d 1, 4-5, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1984); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
346, -, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1986); Ifft, supra note 2, at 1457-58; MissouI
DEPARTMENT OF PuBLIc SAFTY, MIssotru DWI SOBRmTY CHECKPOINT 13 (1986).
But see State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Idaho 1988); Constitutional
Limits, supra note 5, at 594-95.
108. 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 10.8(d), at 81-82.
109. State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 603 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). See
also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
110. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886; Garcia, 489 N.E.2d at
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panion to drive instead or they may call for a taxi to avoid the risk of
being pulled over at a checkpoint. 1 ' Several courts have recognized a
reduction in alcohol-related traffic accidents after the establishment of
sobriety checkpoints.112 While it may be difficult to determine the precise
cause and effect relationship between these two events," 3 on the basis of
common sense one can conclude that sobriety checkpoints possess a strong
deterrent value for potential drunk drivers. 1 4
It is probably easier to justify the use of sobriety checkpoints for their
deterrent value than for their contribution to apprehending drunk drivers.
For example, in Arizona, a sobriety checkpoint that the state promoted
for its effect in detecting drunk drivers was held unconstitutional." 5 Yet,
a similar checkpoint was upheld where the state emphasized its value as
a deterrent to would-be drunk drivers.116 The Welch court made no attempt
to address the distinction between deterring and detecting drunk drivers at
a sobriety checkpoint. Therefore, it is unclear whether a checkpoint that
is conducted solely to detect drunk drivers (i.e., with no advance publicity)
would be upheld in Missouri.
Despite the fact that sobriety checkpoints seem to be effective in helping
to reduce the damage caused by drunk drivers, a checkpoint still constitutes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.1 7 Therefore, courts must analyze
the conduct of a particular checkpoint to determine if that conduct was
reasonable."' It is necessary to ensure that checkpoints can promote the
public interest in the greatest possible manner while also limiting the degree
of intrusion on motorists. 1 9 Although the Welch court did not consider
111. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505-06, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984).
112. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, -, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77
(1984) (roadblocks resulted in significant decrease in alcohol-related collisions, an
effect roving patrols couldn't produce); State v. Church, 530 So. 2d 1235, 1241
n.5 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (reduction of 100 alcohol-related serious injuries during
nine month roadblock trial period); Little, 300 Md. at 505, 479 A.2d at 913
(seventeen percent decrease in alcohol-related traffic accidents after checkpoints
started). See also Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. at __ , 519 A.2d at 991 (citing short-
term and long-term studies that show significant decreases in alcohol-related accidents
after sobriety checkpoint programs instituted).
113. Jones, supra note 5, at 1485.
114. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886.
115. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983)
(en banc). The court did not consider whether or not a sobriety checkpoint may
be effective in detecting a certain percentage of drunk drivers that would not be
detected by roving patrols.
116. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984) (en banc).
117. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
118. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
119. Cf. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51 (two of the three factors to consider in
the constitutional analysis of a roadblock are the degree to which the seizure
advances the public concern and the severity of the interference on individual
liberties).
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all of the issues which other states address about the conduct of sobriety
checkpoints, it did provide some guidance to law enforcement officials who
are to perform future checkpoints, as well as to courts which will decide
their constitutionality. 2 0
ScOTT REYNOLDS
120. Shortly after Welch, the Eastern District Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court ruling which had invalidated a sobriety checkpoint. The court relied
almost exclusively on the holding in Welch. State v. Payne, 759 S.W.2d 252 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988).
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